

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 153984

64

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TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

USMISSION GENEVA

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 153984

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, XG

SUBJECT: CSCE: NAC DISCUSSION ON ACCEPTABLE CSCE OUTCOME

REF: MADRID 4339

1. IN NAC DISCUSSION ON JULY 17 AND 19 YOU SHOULD DRAW
ON FOLLOWING GUIDANCE, IN ADDITION TO THAT CONTAINED
REFTEL.

2. WE ARE GRATIFIED THAT THE NINE AGREE WITH US THAT
THE TIME HAS COME TO IDENTIFY ITEMS OF ESSENTIAL
INTEREST TO THE WEST, AS FRENCH PERMREP DEROSE INDICATED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 153984

IN PRESENTING EC NINE PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT TO THE NAC

(USNATO 3901). FOR OUR PART WE ARE NOT PROPOSING A SUDDEN MOVEMENT TO CONCLUDE CSCE. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL TO AVOID FURTHER AND POSSIBLY ACRIMONIOUS STALEMATE AFTER THE GENEVA TALKS RESUME IN SEPTEMBER, AND TO PRESENT THE SOVIETS WITH POSITIONS ALL ALLIES CAN FIRMLY SUPPORT.

3. WE AGREE WITH THE NINE THAT WARSAW PACT TACTICS ARE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR SLOW PROGRESS TO DATE IN STAGE II TALKS. HOWEVER, SO THAT THE ALLIES CAN GIVE THE SOVIETS A CLEARER VIEW OF ESSENTIAL ALLIED GOALS,

WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, SHOULD DECIDE WHAT THEIR BASIC REQUIREMENTS ARE, DEFINE THEM IN SOME DETAIL, AND THEN AGREE ON A METHOD FOR CONVEYING THEM TO THE SOVIETS SO THAT MOSCOW WILL HAVE BETTER SENSE OF THE RANGE OF CONCESSIONS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED OF THEM IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THEIR AIM OF A STAGE III SUMMIT.

4. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR PREFERRED APPROACH RUNS COUNTER TO THE EC POSITION THAT, IN DEROSE'S WORDS, THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT TRY NOW TO "SET THE PRICE" FOR STAGE III. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WISH TO DEBATE THIS POINT DIRECTLY. IF THE ISSUE ARISES, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE UNDERSTAND, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THAT THE ALLIES CANNOT "SET THE PRICE" FOR STAGE III IN A 35-MEMBER CONFERENCE DEALING WITH VERY DIFFUSE SUBJECT MATTER. HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD STRESS FIRMLY THAT THIS IS NO REPEAT NO BAR TO CONVEYING TO THE SOVIETS WITH CONSIDERABLY MORE PRECISION THAN HERETOFORE WHAT THE WEST REGARDS AS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL STAGE II.

5. BEGIN FYI BY THE SAME TOKEN, THERE IS LITTLE TO BE GAINED IN CONTESTING THE NINE'S POSITION THAT THE DECISION TO GO TO STAGE III, AND IF SO AT WHAT LEVEL, SHOULD BE TAKEN ONLY AT THE END OF STAGE II. IF THE GENEVA TALKS ARE SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED, WE DOUBT THAT ANY OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD DECLINE TO ATTEND THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 153984

STAGE III FINALE. END FYI. SHOULD THE ISSUE ARISE OF WHEN AGREEMENT WOULD BE GIVEN TO A SUMMIT, YOU SHOULD STATE THAT THE IMMEDIATE ALLIED TASK, ON WHICH ALL APPEAR TO AGREE, IS TO DEFINE WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE SATISFACTORY CSCE RESULTS.

6. ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE EC NINE PAPER (USNATO 3900), THE GUIDELINES IT SETS OUT ON THE PRINCIPLES

DECLARATION APPEAR GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS ALLIED POSITIONS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO STUDY THEM IN DETAIL AND MAY WISH TO COMMENT LATER. FOR GENEVA: WE ARE INCLINED TO ACCEPT EC NINE TEXTON PRINCIPLES AS IT STANDS. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU HAVE ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH IT.

7. ON CBMS, WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES SHOULD SET OUT MUCH MORE SPECIFIC GOALS, AND YOU SHOULD REITERATE OUR POSITION ON THIS AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 1F, G AND H OF REFTEL.

8. ON BASKET 3, WE DID NOT SUGGEST SPECIFIC ISSUES OTHER THAN FAMILY-RELATED ONES (REFTEL) ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT OTHER ALLIES WOULD WISH TO INDICATE ISSUES OF PRINCIPAL CONCERN TO THEM. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE ALLIES IDENTIFY THE SIX TO EIGHT KEY ISSUES AMONG THE TWELVE LISTED IN PARA 12 OF THE EC NINE TEXT. FOR EACH OF THESE ISSUES, WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES NEED TO GO BEYOND THE GENERALITIES IN THE EC NINE PAPER (PARAGRAPHS 9, 10 AND 11) AND TO DRAFT THE KEY ELEMENTS OF TEXTS ON THOSE BASKET 3 ISSUES WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS HAVING PRIORITY. THIS IS ESSENTIAL, IN OUR VIEW, IF THE ALLIES ARE TO BE IN A POSITION TO CONVEY TO MOSCOW A PRECISE SENSE OF ALLIED DESIDERATA. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH EACH ISSUE IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER ALLIED DISCUSSION.

9. ON WORK METHODS, WE CAN ACCEPT REMANDING THE MATTER TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS AFTER JULY 17 AND 19 NAC DISCUSSIONS, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE GENEVA DELEGATIONS WOULD SUBMIT A STUDY FOR EARLY NAC CONSIDERATION. DEPENDING ON RESULTS OF THIS STUDY, FURTHER WORK
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 153984

IN BRUSSELS OR GENEVA COULD BE CALLED FOR.

10. FINALLY, IF THE POINT COMES UP, AND TO MEET POSSIBLE FRENCH CONCERNS ON A BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH TO CSCE, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT PROPOSING THAT THE NAC SHOULD ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS OR BECOME A KIND OF COURT OF APPEAL WITH RESPECT TO THE NATO CAUCUS THERE.

11. WE BELIEVE THIS EXERCISE CAN BE COMPLETED EXPEDITIOUSLY IF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUES AT A HIGH POLICY LEVEL, KEEPING THEIR EYE ON THE MAIN OBJECTIVES.

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